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ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGAN EXCHANGE THROUGH THE 
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN 
SERVICES 
INTRODUCTION 
s the baby boomer generation ages and prominent figures 
like Dick Cheney and Steve Jobs attract attention with 
their high profile organ transplants, the question is now ripe in 
the minds of many people around the world: what happens 
when my body fails me?1 While modern medical technology and 
advanced health care2 now allow people to live longer—well 
beyond what one could ever imagine in the past3—many people 
will find that their own organs prove to be the limiting factors 
in reaching a ripe, golden age. When contending with organ 
failure, one must face either the difficult task of finding a 
matching transplant donor or death. Increased trade in organ 
transplant services can help address this critical shortage by 
creating opportunities both for an organ exchange and for a 
system that brings patients to transplant services located 
abroad. 
																																																																																																																												
 1. William Saleton, Help the Next Steve Jobs, SLATE (Oct. 4, 2011), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2011/10/stev
e_jobs_liver_transplant_organ_donation_is_the_best_way_to_ho.html (Steve 
Jobs suffered liver cancer that required him to have a liver transplant. Be-
cause the transplant list was too long in his home community in Northern 
California, he moved to Tennessee to receive the transplant. Jobs’s move sole-
ly for transplantation purposes made headlines because other needy people in 
Northern California did not have the financial resources to move to an area 
with a shorter waiting list.); Scott Shane, For Cheney, 71, New Heart Ends 
20-Month Wait, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/us/politics/dick-cheney-recovering-after-
getting-a-new-heart.html. 
 2. Max Kasriel, Organ Transplants, deny to those not registered as do-
nors, IDEA (Sept. 5, 2009), 
http://www.idebate.org/debatabase/topic_details.php?topicID=923. 
 3. END OF LIFE CARE: AN ETHICAL OVERVIEW, CENTER FOR BIOETHICS AT 
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.ahc.umn.edu/img/assets/26104/End_of_Life.pdf [hereinafter End 
of Life Care]. 
A
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While many countries attempt to increase organ donation 
rates through domestic legislation,4 the practical effect of these 
laws is to discourage international cooperation and restrict the 
efficient movement of organs and people. This Note suggests a 
regulated international organ exchange within the framework 
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), 
whereby countries voluntarily commit to lower trade barriers 
in all services related to the organ transplantation process. In-
creased trade and legitimate exchange in transplantation ser-
vices within the GATS framework would result in a more effi-
cient organ allocation system and increased donation rates. 
Part I of this Note will provide background on the organ sup-
ply shortage, highlighting common problems arising in current 
organ allocation policy, using the United States, the European 
Union, Spain, Israel, and England as case studies. Part II of 
this Note will develop an international exchange program, ex-
plaining why countries should and will participate in the ex-
change. Additionally, Part II will describe potential modes of 
international cooperation and analyze whether these modes 
can be applied effectively in the context of international organ 
procurement and allocation. Part III of this Note will discuss 
first why multilateral cooperation promulgated through the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) is the best 
framework for encouraging trade, then how the exchange will 
operate, and finally, how the exchange will interact with cur-
rent domestic policy in other countries. Part III will also exam-
ine potential limitations to an international organ exchange 
and the GATS framework. 
																																																																																																																												
 4. Melisa Martínez et. al, The Potential for Bi-lateral Agreements in Medi-
cal Tourism: A Qualitative Study of Stakeholder Perspectives From the UK 
and India, 7 GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH at 6 (May 3, 2011), 
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/7/1/11; Council Directive 
2010/45, 2010 O.J. (L 207/14) 1, 1 (EC)[hereinafter Directive]; J. Lavee et. al, 
A new law for allocation of donor organs in Israel, LANCET 1131, 1131, March 
27, 2010, available at 
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(09)61795-
5/fulltext. 
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I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ORGAN TRANSPLANT CRISIS 
A. Global Organ Shortages 
Countries worldwide have faced dire organ supply shortages 
for decades, and the problem has become more severe due to 
decreasing fatalities from traffic accidents in developed coun-
tries.5 Except for Iran, which allows organs to be sold, the wait-
ing lists in every country are extremely long and the process is 
very costly.6 These costs are not only exorbitant for patients, 
but also for the governments that often pay for end-of-life 
health care.7 In 2005, 14,000 people in the United States died 
with transplantable organs that were not used for needy pa-
tients, and yet even if every one of these people had elected to 
be donors, there would still be an overwhelming shortage.8 
With the United States health care system already hemorrhag-
ing dollars, the government is seeking to cut costs, and the ba-
by boomers—aging and thus increasing the demand for organ 
transplants—will feel the effects of the government’s tight 
budget constraint.9 
																																																																																																																												
 5. Opting Out of Opting Out: Britain Rejects “Presumed Consent” for Or-
gan Donors—For the Time Being, ECON. (Nov. 20, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com/node/12641944. 
 6. Organ Transplants: Psst, Wanna Buy a Kidney: Governments Should 
Let People Trade Kidneys, Not Convict Them For It, ECON. (Nov. 16, 2006), 
http://www.economist.com/node/8173039. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Mark S. Nadel & Carolina A. Nadel, Using Reciprocity to Motivate Or-
gan Donation, YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293, 293–295 (2005); Gil 
Siegal and Richard J. Bonnie, Closing the Organ Gap: A Reciprocity-Based 
Social Contract Approach, 34 DNA FINGERPRINTING & CIVIL LIBERTIES 415, 
415 (2006); The gap between supply and demand: As demand for life-saving 
transplant surgery grows, the idea of paying donors is gaining support, ECON. 
(Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/12380981 [hereinafter The gap 
between supply and demand]; Only 43 percent of adults in the United States 
are registered organ donors, leaving a waiting list of nearly 114,000 people in 
2012. Michelle Healy, Now Facebook Wants You to Give Up Your Organs, 
USA TODAY (May 2, 2012, 10:21 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/now-
facebook-wants-you-to-give-up-your-organs-2012-5. 
 9. Teck Chuan Voo et. al.; The Ethics of Organ Transplantation: Shortag-
es and Strategies, 38 ACAD. MED. SINGAPORE 359, 359 (2009), available at 
http://www.cwsl.edu/content/faculty/05%20voo%20et%20al%20-
%20the%20ethics%20of%20organ%20transplantation.pdf; An Overview of 
Health Care: A Population Perspective, JB LEARNING 17, available at 
http://www.jblearning.com/samples/0763749745/49745_Ch01.pdf. 
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Most countries are unwilling to let needy patients buy or-
gans, and disapprove of the use of methods by a minority of 
countries that may be morally objectionable, such as harvest-
ing organs from executed prisoners.10  Some individuals and 
even some national governments have tried radical or illegal 
strategies to alleviate the shortages, including open organ sale, 
organ trafficking, and transplant tourism. The World Health 
Organization (“WHO”), however, maintains their official posi-
tion is that the sale of organs in a commercial transaction, or 
their exchange for valuable consideration, should be banned in 
all countries.11 Similarly, in the United States, the “National 
Organ Transplantation Act ([“NOTA”])…[also prohibits the ex-
change of]… ‘valuable consideration’ for organ donation.’“12 
Although organ trafficking is illegal in most countries,13 it 
still is highly appealing to wealthy sick patients and to groups 
who look to benefit from this desperation. Organ trafficking 
through the black market is flourishing even in the early twen-
ty-first century.14 In many cases this illegal organ trafficking 
																																																																																																																												
 10. Jiefu Huang et. al, Government Policy and organ transplantation in 
China, LANCET 1937, 1937 (Dec. 2008), 
http://www.lancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(08)61359-
8/fulltext. In “China, more than 90% of transplanted organs are obtained 
form executed prisoners.” Id. 
 11. Directive, supra note 4, at 1. 
 12. Siegal & Bonnie, supra note 8, at 416. 
 13. Sheri R. Glaser, Formula to Stop the Illegal Organ Trade: Presumed 
Consent Laws and Mandatory Reporting Requirements for Doctors, 12 HUM. 
RTS. BRIEF 20, 20 (2005), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/12/2glaser.pdf?rd=1 (“Organ trafficking 
violates fundamental human rights, such as the rights to life, liberty, security 
in person, and freedom from cruel or inhumane treatment. As such, several 
international organizations have established standards on organ trafficking. 
These include the World Health Organization’s Guiding Principles on Human 
Organ Transplantation (1991); the World Medical Authority . . . ; the Council 
of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) and its 
Optional Protocol Concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Hu-
man Origin (2002); and the Bellagio Task Force.”) 
 14. Jeneen Interlandi, Not Just Urban Legend, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 9, 2009, 
7:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/01/09/not-just-
urban-legend.html (“international organ trafficking—mostly of kidneys, but 
also of half-livers, eyes, skin and blood—is flourishing . . . . The World Health 
Organization estimates that one fifth of the 70,000 kidneys transplanted 
worldwide every year come from the black market.” Organ trafficking even 
involves U.S. hospitals and often “for about $150,000 per transplant . . . or-
gan brokers [can] reach across continents to connect buyers and sellers, 
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preys on the poor and exploits them, subjecting them to dan-
gerous operations that carry the risk of spreading diseases and 
killing both the donor and recipient.15 
The common perception of organ trafficking is that it takes 
place in a dark, dirty, “back room” in a developing country and 
that it often involves organized crime. In reality, organ traffick-
ing also occurs in many developed countries like the United 
States and countries within the European Union.16 Such per-
ceptions, and the horror stories precipitating them, negatively 
impact the legitimate organ transplant processes, and thereby 
discourage the principle of altruism that most systems around 
the world depend upon for their organ supply.17 
Another model individuals utilize to increase their chances of 
obtaining a life-saving organ is by engaging in transplant tour-
																																																																																																																												
whom they then guided to “broker-friendly” hospitals here in the United 
States.”). Dan Bilefsky, Black Market for Body Parts Spreads Among the Poor 
in Europe, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/world/europe/black-market-for-body-
parts-spreads-in-europe.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1346432663-
VPWTbOQ+snTT/8JIM12XSg; Matthew Brunwasser, Trial Opens for 7 Koso-
vars in Organ-Trafficking Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/world/europe/trial-opens-for-7-kosovars-
in-organ-trafficking-case.html?_r=1&emc=eta1. 
 15. Claire Suddath & Alex Altman, How Does Kidney-Trafficking Work?, 
TIME (July 27, 2009), 
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1912880,00.html; see also 
Interlandi, supra note 14 (Lawrence Cohen, an anthropologist at UC Berke-
ley, discovered that there are pressures on many women in developing coun-
tries, such as India, to sell organs either voluntarily or out of fealty to their 
husbands demands that they “contribute to the family’s income, or to provide 
for the dowry of a daughter.”) 
 16. Suddath, supra note 15; see also Interlandi, supra note 14 (a needy 
Israeli citizen was even able to find “an organ broker through a local paper in 
Tel Aviv who arranged to have the transplant done at Mount Sinai Medical 
Center in New York.”); Bilefsky, supra note 14. The gap between supply and 
demand, supra note 8, at 4 (Many U.S. citizens were outraged when an “in-
vestigation by the Los Angeles Times [that] found that four notorious Japa-
nese criminals received transplants at the Medical Center of the University 
of California Los Angeles, apparently jumping a queue of needy Americans.”); 
Yosuke Shimazono, The State of the International Organ Trade: A Provisional 
Picture Based on Integration of Available Information, 85 BULL. WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. 955, 956 (2007), available at 
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/12/06-039370.pdf (“Finding a “trans-
plant package” is easy with a simple online search, which reveals that “the 
price of a renal transplant package [ranges] from US$70,000 to 160,000.”) 
 17. The gap between supply and demand, supra note 8. 
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ism.18 Transplant tourism is a concept similar to medical tour-
ism where a citizen of one country travels to another country 
for a variety of health services.19 The term “transplant tourism” 
is often used with a negative connotation and the WHO even 
adopted resolution WHA57.18, which “urges Member States to 
‘take measures to protect the poorest and vulnerable groups 
from ‘transplant tourism.’”20 Some scholars refer to transplant 
tourism as “the purchase and sale . . . of organs . . . and other 
elements relating to the commercialization of organ transplan-
tation” including any “intermediaries and health-care providers 
who arrange the travel and recruit donors.”21 Critics of medical 
tourism find fault in this means of obtaining treatment because 
it is often only available to the wealthy and in the case of 
transplant tourism, specifically, may encourage the rise of a 
black market for organs in countries with a weak regulatory 
system or with a large poor population, such as India or Chi-
na.22 
Putting aside the negative connotations of the term “trans-
plant tourism,” it is essential for this analysis to examine the 
term in its most literal and legal sense: transplant tourism oc-
curs when a person travels internationally to seek an organ 
transplant or related services. Utilizing this neutral definition 
of transplant tourism reveals the potential positive aspects of 
transplant tourism within a well-structured and legitimate 
regulatory framework. 
 
B. Current Allocation Systems in the International Community 
Throughout the world, the two most popular organ procure-
ment systems are embodied in two systems, known as “opt-in” 
																																																																																																																												
 18. Id. at 2. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.; WHO Resolution WHA57.18, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 56, 57, 
available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA57/A57_R18-en.pdf 
(2004). 
 21. Yosuke, supra note 16. 
 22. The gap between supply and demand, supra note 8 (In 2008, an inves-
tigation found that “109 [patients], mainly Israelis, each paid up to $120,000 
for a ‘transplant holiday’); Yosuke, supra note 16. 
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or “opt-out” systems.23 The United States’ organ procurement 
system is an example of an opt-in system, in which individuals 
must make an explicit decision to donate their organs, and re-
lies on altruistic organ donors to support organ supply.24 In an 
opt-out system—also referred to as presumed consent—“an in-
dividual is treated as having consented to donate organs absent 
express instructions to the contrary.”25 The world’s most suc-
cessful organ donation system, in Spain, is an opt-out system.26 
The United States regulates organ donation through the 
United Network for Organ Sharing (“UNOS”).27 “The allocation 
of organs among those on the UNOS waiting list is based, to a 
large degree, on compatibility. For most organs, [however], 
consideration is first given to recipients located within the 
same donation service area (“DSA”) as the donor.”28 The cur-
rent system gives higher priority to patients in these DSA are-
as, despite the fact that with modern medical advancements, 
other needier patients that are longer distances away may be 
capable of receiving them.29 UNOS’s regulations also effectively 
create a 5% maximum cap on transplants that can go to non-
resident aliens through an audit mechanism.30 UNOS recogniz-
																																																																																																																												
 23. Eurotransplant: Legislation within the Eurotransplant Region, 
EUROTRANSPLANT.ORG (Apr 29, 2011), 1, 
http://www.eurotransplant.org/cms/mediaobject.php?file=legislation.pdf. 
 24. Siegal & Bonnie, supra note 8, at 416. 
 25. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 8, at 307. 
 26. Id. at 302–303. 
 27. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 8, at 299. 
 28. Id. at 300 (“Nationwide, there are fifty eight DSAs, which are regional 
combinations of organ procurement organizations (or OPOs) and their trans-
plant center networks.”). 
 29. The Gift of a Lifetime, Understanding Donation: The Organ Transplant 
Waiting List, ORGANTRANSPLANTS.ORG, 
http://www.organtransplants.org/understanding/unos/ [hereinafter Gift of a 
Lifetime]; D.L Segev et. al, Transporting Live Donor Kidneys for Kidney- 
Paired Donation: Initial National Results, 11 AM. J. TRANSPLANT 356, 360 
(2011). 
 30. Transplantation of Non-Resident Aliens, ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND 
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK. 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_18.pdf 
[hereinafter Transplantation of Non-Resident Aliens] (last updated Sept. 1, 
2012) (specific policies for non resident aliens); UNOS’s regulations in regard 
to non-resident aliens state that “all member transplant centers agree to al-
low the Ad Hoc International Relations Committee to review and audit, at its 
discretion, all center activities pertaining to transplantation of non-resident 
aliens. The Committee will review the activities of each member transplant 
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es that “international exchange of organs for transplantation is 
technically feasible but remains an uncommon procedure.”31 
Under this policy, “[e]xportation of organs from the United 
States or its territories is prohibited unless a well documented 
and verifiable effort, coordinated through the Organ Center, 
has failed to find a suitable recipient for that organ on the 
[w]aiting [l]ist.” 32 Because thousands of Americans die every 
year awaiting a transplant, 33 almost all organs will be trans-
planted domestically. 
Opt-out or presumed consent organ procurement systems 
have been very successful for countries that have implemented 
them. 34  Spain celebrates the highest donation rates in the 
world.35 Many scholars suggest that Spain’s public relations 
campaign and widespread knowledge and information about 
organ donation is the reason for their successful organ alloca-
tion program.36 In the “Spanish Model . . . a specially trained 
team, separate from the medical transplant teams, is responsi-
ble for increasing organ donations” by educating families about 
the positive aspects of organ donation, and providing them with 
all of the information they need to make an informed decision 
based on correct information.37 The Spanish model also empha-
sizes comforting families and respecting the donor’s wishes and 
creates legitimacy for the allocation system.38 Because of its 
positive results, other countries, including the United States, 
have attempted to implement similar educational programs but 
without major success.39 
																																																																																																																												
center where non-resident alien recipients constitute more than 5% of recipi-
ents of any particular type of deceased organ.” Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Policy Management – policies, 3.2.1.4, ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND 
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK (last updated Sept. 1, 2012) Sept. 1, 2012, 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/policiesAndBylaws/policies.asp (Links to gen-
eral policies) [hereinafter Policy Management- policies]. 
 33. The gap between supply and demand, supra note 8. 
 34. Opting Out of Opting Out, supra note 5. 
 35. Id. (Spain is considered the “the world champion of cadaveric organ 
donation, with 34.4 donors per million inhabitants compared with Britain’s 
meager 10.6.”). 
 36. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 8, at 302–303. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. “A study in the United States showed that “about half of families 
asked to donate refused. In addition to the reasons noted above, some fami-
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Facing familiar dire organ shortages, other countries have al-
so attempted to reform their allocation systems in other inno-
vative ways. In late summer 2012, the European Union adopt-
ed and implemented a directive relating to the harmonization 
of health and safety standards across Member Nations in order 
to facilitate donations and ensure the highest quality of organ 
donation services.40 The EU legislators suggest that one way to 
help the organ shortage within the EU is to promote standard-
ized health and safety standards through a directive named the 
European Union Organ Donation Directive (“EUODD”).41 The 
EU believes that “the exchange of organs is an important way 
of increasing the number of organs available and ensuring a 
better match between donor and recipient and therefore im-
proving the quality of transplantation . . . available organs 
should be able to cross borders without unnecessary problems 
and delays.”42 Another major aspect of the EUODD is making 
organs traceable, especially when there is an organ exchange 
with a developing country. 43  Although this requirement at-
tempts to prevent the spread of diseases and adverse reactions, 
this stringent requirement is harsher on developing countries 
that will find this policy overly burdensome and prohibitive be-
cause their organ procurement and medical systems are not as 
advanced as the EU’s.44 
Israel also reformed its organ donation laws in an unprece-
dented and controversial way. 45  Israel, an opt-in country, 
adopted a law that went into effect in January 2010 with a 
“plan to increase the national number of individuals who have 
																																																																																																																												
lies are unwilling to delay funerals, and many act out of concern that the de-
ceased ‘has already suffered enough.’” Id. at 299. 
 40. Directive, supra note 4, at 1; NHS Blood and Transplant, EU Directive 
on the Standards of Quality and Safety of Human Organs Intended for 
Transplantation, NHS BLOOD AND TRANSPLANT (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/downloads/board_papers/sept12/r12_91_EUODD_B
oard_Paper_September_12_3.pdf. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Directive, supra note 4, at 1. 
 44. Id. (The text of the EUODD with respect to third world and developing 
countries reads as follows: “Organ exchange […] shall be allowed only where 
the organs … can be traced from the donor to the recipient and vice versa; … 
meet the quality and safety requirements equivalent to those laid down in 
this Directive.”). 
 45. Lavee, supra note 4, at 1131. 
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a donor card by giving priority in organ allocation to transplant 
candidates who had signed a donor card before their listing 
date.” 46  Organ allocation priority would also be “granted to 
transplant candidates with a first-degree relative who was a 
deceased organ donor and to any live donor of a kidney, liver 
lobe, or lung lobe who subsequently needs an organ.”47 This 
new prioritization scheme is very controversial because it al-
lows people to “skip the line,” and bases allocation decisions on 
factors other than medical need.48 It may also generate prob-
lems with religious observers; religious Jews, for example, re-
quire that a body be treated in a particular way so as to not 
blemish the body or disgrace the dead, and observe prompt bur-
ial practices.49 Although most rabbis support organ donation, 
some people’s faith may not allow them to elect to be a donor.50 
One commentary suggests that yet another “potential ethical 
implication of the law is that it favours larger families with 
more first-degree relatives who are, on paper, willing to be do-
nors.”51 
In recent years, Great Britain has changed their allocation 
rules, as well.52 In July 2009, “the British government said . . . 
that it plan[ned] to ban private organ transplants from dead 
donors to allay fears that prospective recipients can buy their 
way to the front of the line.”53 Although in practice this policy 
would only affect the foreign patients coming to Great Britain 
																																																																																																																												
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Gabrielle Loeb, Judaism’s perspectives on Organ Donation After Death, 
PHILADELPHIA JEWISH VOICE (Sept. 2008), 
http://www.pjvoice.com/v38/38700judaism.aspx. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Victoria Y. Fan et. al, A New Law for Allocation of Donor Organs in 
Israel, LANCET (July 24, 2010), 
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(10)61138-
5/fulltext (referring to Wright and Silva, scholars in the field who have writ-
ten articles in The Lancet). 
 52. Opting Out of Opting Out, supra note 5 (“Great Britain recently reject-
ed a proposal to switch from an opt-in system to a presumed consent or opt-
out policy, because of concerns about eliminating ‘the emotional benefit to 
recipients and their families of knowing that the organ had been freely sur-
rendered—as a gift.’”). 
 53. Private Organ Transplants Banned in the UK, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 
31, 2009, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32234139/ns/health-
health_care/t/private-organ-transplants-banned-uk/#.UHcdY8VZXSg. 
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to receive private transplants and publically funded trans-
plants for domestic patients would still be permissible, this sys-
tem would implement a protectionist policy, disadvantaging 
any private transplant tourism and would effectively close the 
borders to those non-citizens seeking to utilize Great Britain’s 
sophisticated facilities or resources.54 
II. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR 
EXCHANGE 
Why should countries trade in or exchange organs and organ 
transplantation services rather than keeping these valuable 
resources domestically? Countries should exchange because of 
the gains from international trade, which are typical for other 
goods,55 and because of the altruistic principles upon which 
most allocation systems are built.56 There are numerous ways 
that international actors can exchange, including unilateral 
trade, reciprocity-based trade, bilateral trade, and multilateral 
trade. It is important to utilize the right method of cooperation 
in order to increase the welfare of needy and sick patients 
worldwide. This section introduces the possible modes of inter-
national cooperation and introduces the idea that organ trans-
plantation services should be multilaterally traded, specifically 
using the GATS. 
A. Why Countries Should Trade or Exchange Organ Transplan-
tation Services 
Basic economic theory suggests that there are important 
gains from trade and exchange in commercial goods in open 
markets.57 There are also benefits from liberalizing trade in 
other international markets, regardless of whether the goods 
and services are being traded for valuable consideration in a 
traditional open market.58 In the context of organ procurement 
and allocation, systems that previously operated only in small 
																																																																																																																												
 54. Id. 
 55. GATS: Fact and Fiction, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 3 (2001), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsfacts1004_e.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2012) [hereinafter GATS: Fact and Fiction]. 
 56. Gift of a Lifetime, supra note 29. 
 57. The Case for Open Trade, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2012). 
 58. GATS: Fact and Fiction, supra note 55, at 3. 
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local areas are becoming more geographically widespread59 and 
an international exchange is possible. Before Congress promul-
gated national legislation regarding transplantation, organ 
transplants were performed on a local basis, establishing local 
primacy.60 As a consequence, along with medical criteria, geo-
graphic distances, the cost of transport, and the high risk that 
an organ could perish during transport became prominent cri-
teria in local priority schemes in the early years of NOTA.61 Be-
cause of medical advancements, faster transportation methods, 
and preservation techniques, this system is now outdated, and 
organs can reach people outside of the regional transplant cen-
ter’s area.62 These outdated geographic center-based allocation 
systems need to be expanded and incorporate international co-
operation.63 
1. Altruistic Justifications for Exchange 
A move towards an international organ exchange is support-
ed by the ethical underpinnings of the principle upon which 
most countries in the world base their systems: altruism.64 Al-
truism in this context suggests that it is morally right to do-
nate your organs at death because your generosity could save 
you neighbor’s life.65 Some scholars argue that “organs donated 
from deceased donors should be considered a national resource 
and are not ‘owned’ by the local or retrieval team,” and that or-
																																																																																																																												
 59. Segev, supra note 29, at 360. 
 60. John P. Roberts, Prioritization and Distribution of Organs for Liver 
Transplantation, CENTER SPAN, 
http://www.centerspan.org/pubs/liver/roberts1.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 
2012). 
 61. Id.; John M. Coombes and James F. Trotter, Development of the Allo-
cation System for Deceased Donor Liver Transplants, 3 CLINICAL MED. & RES. 
87, 88–89 (2005), available at 
http://www.clinmedres.org/content/3/2/87.full.pdf. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See also Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance on a Constraint on Markets, 21 J. 
OF ECON. PERSP. 37, 38 (2007) (explaining that gains from exchange in kid-
neys can be realized and have been realized in kidney exchange programs in 
New England). 
 64. Siegal & Bonnie, supra note 8, at 416. 
 65. Id. (noting that all allocation systems depend to some degree on the 
generosity of society to donate). 
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gans should be distributed nationally to needy patients.66 The 
idea that organs do not belong to any one area or country 
aligns with the general motivations of altruistic donation. Evi-
dence suggests that when a person elects to be a donor, they do 
not do so solely to benefit their small geographic area and that 
they will not be deterred from donation if they knew their or-
gan would be distributed to another area.67 
Since organ transplantation can easily save a life, it is hard 
to rationalize the United States’ outdated domestic geographic 
system; the same reasoning applies to keeping organs as a na-
tional resource and not an international resource. John 
Donne’s famous saying that “no man is an island now extends 
with equal force to communities, regions, nations, continents—
and, for that matter, to islands.”68 When someone in Brazil or 
Russia desperately needs an organ, why is that person more-or-
less deserving than an American or EU citizen? The current 
geographic limitations on organ donation “lead to some arbi-
trary variation,” which do not align with the principle of altru-
ism.69 
2. Theoretical Justifications for Exchange 
Framing global justice in terms of the philosopher John 
Rawls’s difference principle, a society should redistribute 
wealth to increase the welfare of “the status of the least well-off 
members of society.”70 Restricting organs to one locale or one 
country not only violates this principle, but it also unfairly fa-
vors people in a country with good transplantation, allocation, 
and regulatory systems, even if those people would never altru-
istically donate themselves. Modern liberal philosopher Loren 
Lomasky explains that in Rawls’s later works he recognized 
that the difference principle itself might not apply globally. 
Rawls believed that “many people believe that their obligations 
																																																																																																																												
 66. James Neuberger & Gill Thomas, When the Law Meets Organ Trans-
plantation: The Experience from the United Kingdom, 92 TRANSPLANT J. 262 
(Aug. 15, 2011). 
 67. Institute of Medicine (U.S.) Committee on Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Policy, Organ procurement and transplantation, NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 52 (1999) [hereinafter Institute of Medicine]. 
 68. Loren E. Lomasky, Liberalism Beyond Borders, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & 
POLICY FOUND. 206, 207 (2007). 
 69. Neuberger & Thomas , supra note 66, at 262. 
 70. Lomasky, supra note 68, at 208. 
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to co-nationals are weightier and more extensive than those 
owed to extra-nationals.”71 Similarly, current domestic-oriented 
organ allocations systems place a higher weight on the lives of 
citizens in that particular country. Nonetheless, Lomasky be-
lieves that there are still important moral obligations to those 
outside one’s close community.72 In particular, Lomaksy argues 
that it is important to not cause inadvertent harm through pol-
icies that restrict the movement of goods or people.73 Since or-
gan failure has no direct connections with a person’s place in 
society, either financially or geographically, restricting organs 
to one DSA causes harm to those outside the area by restricting 
the efficient movement of organs. These geographic restrictions 
are not only hurting needy patients, they are “an unjustifiable 
restraint on liberty . . . [just like many] cross-border employ-
ment and residence agreements.”74 International cooperation in 
the context of organ transplantation may achieve better results 
for the welfare of people around the world. 
Governments and countries also have practical considera-
tions that should motivate them to adopt a system of interna-
tional cooperation, including increasing efficiency, reducing 
health care and transaction costs, responding to strong political 
pressures, and increasing overall donation rates. These practi-
cal motivations, discussed in Part IV, may combat the tradi-
tional skepticism of sharing organs within countries and across 
borders that plague many current allocation systems. 
B. Methods of International Cooperation 
Countries must interact efficiently with each other in their 
international dealings, and this can be achieved through vari-
ous strategies of international cooperation. 75  Countries may 
decide to take unilateral action with respect to other countries, 
utilize reciprocity agreements to trade or exchange commodi-
ties between countries, or cooperate through bilateral or multi-
lateral agreements. Each of these alternative modes of coopera-
																																																																																																																												
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 218. 
 73. Id. at 228. 
 74. Id. at 226. 
 75. William Zartman & Saadia Touval, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION: THE EXTENTS AND LIMITS OF MULTILATERALISM, 4 (William 
Zartman & Saadia Touval eds., 2010) [hereinafter Zartman]. 
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tion in the context of organ transplantation has important im-
plications on domestic and foreign needy patients. 
1. Unilateral Action 
Countries often unilaterally dictate their own policies for the 
treatment of other countries or foreign citizens.76 A country ba-
ses its domestic laws on its own laws, values, and its citizens’ 
preferences.77 In an immigration law context, for example, a 
country unilaterally chooses its policies regarding the move-
ment of foreigners in and out of the its territory, despite the 
fact that these laws may affect other countries.78 
Similarly, in the context of organ transplantation, countries 
like the United States and the United Kingdom unilaterally 
implement laws based on their own policy concerns.79 This re-
stricts foreigners’ access to organs and organ transplantation 
services.80 Currently the most common method that countries 
utilize in the context of organ transplantation is the unilateral 
method with little to no coordination with other countries.81 
2. Reciprocity 
Countries may also choose to adopt a system of reciprocity, 
where countries trade goods or favors and keep track of the 
levels of exchange, in effect creating a commodity-type trading 
regime. This also could be characterized as “tit-for-tat” trad-
ing.82 
Visa reciprocity provides an example of this kind of relation-
ship. Brazil, Argentina, and Chile are all countries that prac-
tice visa reciprocity, which requires foreigners to obtain expen-
																																																																																																																												
 76. Shashi Tharoor, Why America Still Needs The United Nations, 
FOREIGN AFF. (Sep./Oct. 2003), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59184/shashi-tharoor/why-america-
still-needs-the-united-nations. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Gordon H. Hanson, The Governance of Migration Policy, 2009 UCSD 
AND NBER 1, at 1 available at http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/037/11123.pdf. 
 79. Transplantation of Non-Resident Aliens, supra note 30; Martínez et al., 
supra note 4, at 6. 
 80. Transplantation of Non-Resident Aliens, supra note 30; Martínez et al., 
supra note 4, at 6. 
 81. Opting Out of Opting Out, supra note 5; Policy Management – policies, 
supra note 32, at 3.2.1.4. 
 82. Zartman, supra note 75, at 6. 
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sive visas—sometimes up to $150—if their home country re-
quires a visa for citizens of the destination country when they 
enter the traveler’s home country.83 For example, the United 
States does not require a British traveler to obtain a visa to vis-
it the United States, but does require Brazilians to obtain a vi-
sa.84 In response, Americans traveling to Brazil are required to 
obtain a visa prior to traveling in Brazil. 85  This method is 
based on tit-for-tat exchange where countries keep track of the 
treatment by others and treat them accordingly in the future.86 
Scholars often approach agreements in health services, and 
specifically organ transplantation, through the lens of reciproc-
ity or tit-for-tat organ trading between centers.87 In organ allo-
cation reciprocity “those who committed to donate organs 
would be granted a preference in the event that they later re-
quired a transplant.”88 Some scholars suggest that a reciprocity 
or “payback scheme” may be the solution to the organ shortage 
“whereby a center (or sometimes a country) which provides an 
organ to another center or country for a ‘high priority’ recipient 
will be paid back when another organ becomes available.”89 A 
group of scholars suggests one version of a reciprocity ar-
rangement that is based on a social contract in the form of in-
surance: a person would receive a bonus for electing to be a do-
nor and in exchange they would have a better chance of receiv-
ing an organ if they needed it in the future.90 Because these 
reciprocity and insurance ideas use the fear of needing a trans-
plant in the future in order to motivate people to donate, they 
are subject to criticism that they do not align with the tradi-
																																																																																																																												
 83. Eileen Smith, Argentina Joins the Reciprocity Club: U.S. Visitors Pay 
$131 on Entry, MATADORNETWORK.COM (Dec. 14, 2009), 
http://matadornetwork.com/trips/argentina-joins-the-reciprocity-club-u-s-
visitors-to-pay-131-on-entry/. 
 84. Tim Rogers, Let Them In: How Brazilians Could Help the U.S. Econo-
my, TIME (June 3, 2011), 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2075717,00.html; Visa & 
ESTA Information, VISIT USA (2011), http://www.visitusa.org.uk/Visa-and-
ESTA-Information/125. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Zartman, supra note 75, at 6. 
 87. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 8, at 294. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Neuberger & Thomas, supra note 66, at 263. 
 90. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 8, at 314 (This “bonus would be phased in, 
based on how long a patient had been registered as willing to donate.”) 
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tional principle of altruism.91 Countries do not allow organs to 
be exchanged for “valuable consideration” because they believe 
that altruism and generosity should be the driving force for do-
nation.92 Reciprocity does not promote the moral underpinnings 
of altruism, and thus is not a realistic policy change.93 Reci-
procity is not consistent with the spirit of an international ex-
change because it emphasizes the idea that an organ belongs to 
one country, while in reality, no country “owns” an organ.94 
3. Bilateral Cooperation 
Another theory of international cooperation is based on bilat-
eral agreements regarding the treatment of the citizens of both 
countries. Bilateral cooperation may occur in the context of any 
specialized trade agreement between two countries,95 or other 
direct interactions, such as those pertaining to countries’ estab-
lishment of their surrounding borders.96 By their very nature, 
border disputes require countries to work bilaterally to gener-
ate common laws and policy that complement each other.97 For 
example, the United States and Mexico have bilaterally negoti-
ated to put into place particular regulations and procedures 
concerning the maintenance and integrity of their common 
border.98 
In the context of organ transplantation, another potential 
mechanism for cooperation is a bilateral agreement to trade 
services. A group of scholars conducted a survey of subjects in 
India and England to measure their attitudes toward a possible 
bilateral trade agreement concerning organ transplantation.99 
The study found that while trade may be mutually beneficial 
for both countries, the public was skeptical of such an agree-
																																																																																																																												
 91. Id. 
 92. Siegal & Bonnie, supra note 8, at 416. 
 93. Gift of a Lifetime, supra note 29. 
 94. Neuberger & Thomas, supra note 66, at 262. 
 95. Forms of International Cooperation, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/migration-management-
foundations/international-cooperation/forms-international-
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er01 (last visited Oct. 4, 2012). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Martínez et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
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ment.100 The public perception of the bilateral agreement was 
prohibitory because there was no regulatory framework or pub-
lic relations campaign to reveal how the agreement actually 
operated or could be beneficial.101 Any bilateral cooperation in 
organ transplant services will suffer from the same pitfalls be-
cause, with just two countries participating in exchange, the 
public will question if there will be any real gains from trade 
and question the quality of the other country’s health care.102 
This is due to the fact that bilateral exchange can exacerbate 
inequities in bargaining power between countries, especially 
when there is a lack of a legitimate, regulated system.103 “Bi-
lateral deals with other countries [often create] unbalanced . . . 
one-on-one negotiations, [which] opens the way for all manner 
of lobbies to ram their self-serving demands into the agree-
ments.”104 A system that could offer more transparency, legiti-
macy, and a more sophisticated regulatory framework—like 
multilateral exchange—would be more beneficial in the organ 
transplantation context. 
4. Multilateral Cooperation 
The final example of international cooperation is multilateral 
cooperation, where countries come together and make agree-
																																																																																																																												
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. The study established that the best framework in this context 
would be a bilateral relationship, with contract-based terms, which could be 
individually customized. Id. at 2–3. It conducted “a total of 30 semi-
structured interviews . . ., 20 in India and 10 in the UK.” Id. at 3. The inter-
views revealed that Indians generally thought their medical services were 
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quality and safety of procedures in India and did not think they could benefit 
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icine is very sophisticated. Id. at 5. In fact, 70–80% of Indian doctors are 
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in the United States and Britain. Id. at 5. 
 102. Id. at 1 
 103. Jagdish Bhagwati, The Wrong Way to Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/opinion/25bhagwati.html. As not-
ed economist and professor at Columbia University, Jagdish Bhagwati, ar-
gued in the New York Times, “bilateral trade agreements are not the same as 
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tariffs and antidumping charges, which countries impose on imports that 
they believe are priced artificially low.” Id. 
 104. Id. 
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ments with each other in order to lower transaction costs and 
decrease trade barriers.105 Multilateral agreements may come 
in various forms, but often contain non-discrimination agree-
ments between countries, or in some cases most-favored and 
national treatment clauses, where countries agree to treat all 
parties to the agreement as favorably as all other countries.106 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), signed 
originally in 1947, is a well-known example of a multilateral 
cooperation in which over 100 countries eventually came to-
gether diplomatically in “Rounds” (or diplomatic summits) and 
established standards for the international trade in goods.107 
The GATT treaty was designed to coordinate tariff concessions 
and included national treatment, most favored nation (“MFN”), 
and non-discrimination clauses in order to ensure the integrity 
of the system and to presumably level the playing field for the 
member countries.108 
Although countries have not attempted any multilateral co-
operation in the context of organ transplantation and alloca-
tion, there is potential for cooperation. While some groups of 
countries, like the EU, have begun to coordinate their organ 
allocation systems through harmonization of health and safety 
standards,109 countries need more multilateral negotiations to 
achieve the optimal level of international organ exchange and 
																																																																																																																												
 105. Zartman, supra note 75, at 67. 
 106. Douglas A. Irwin, Multilateral and Bilateral policies In the World 
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to establish a transparent and legitimate system. Instances of 
individuals attempting to begin a grassroots international or-
gan exchange occurred recently where an American woman do-
nated a kidney to a Greek man and because of this generosity 
the Greek man’s wife donated her kidney to a patient in Penn-
sylvania.110 Countries now have the opportunity to facilitate 
this type of exchange between international patients with mul-
tilateral cooperation and to assist individuals who would like to 
spread their generosity internationally. For these reasons, and 
others discussed below, multilateral efforts to create an inter-
national organ exchange, specifically through the GATS, is the 
preferable mode of cooperation, and could potentially inspire 
the international community to be more inclined to donate, 
thereby alleviating the international organ shortage. 
III. THE GATS’S APPLICATION TO AN INTERNATIONAL ORGAN 
EXCHANGE 
This Part will more fully introduce the GATS, describe its re-
lation to health services, and explain why the regulation of or-
gan transplantation is best achieved through the GATS frame-
work. It will also explicate how the regulation would practically 
operate, and outline other necessary and complimentary char-
acteristics that should accompany regulation through the 
GATS. It will then discuss this proposal’s interaction with cur-
rent domestic laws in countries around the world, possible limi-
tations to an exchange, and regulation of that exchange 
through the GATS. 
A. Introduction to the GATS 
The GATS was created in 1995 through the adoption of 
measures under the Uruguay Rounds, which also created the 
WTO.111 In contrast to the well-known GATT, which focuses on 
trade in goods, the GATS focuses on “measures affecting inter-
national trade in services—including health services such as 
health insurance, hospital services, telemedicine, and acquisi-
																																																																																																																												
 110. Lindy Royce-Bartlett, infra note 185. 
 111. Services Trade, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_e.htm (last visited October 3, 
2012) [hereinafter Services Trade]. 
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tion of medical treatment abroad.”112 The purpose of the GATS 
is to create an international business climate where trade bar-
riers are low in order “to promote efficiency and economic 
growth.”113 Currently, not all countries have made concessions 
under the treaty in order to increase the flow of services.114 The 
GATS agreement is overseen by the WTO and “requires coun-
tries to provide national treatment to foreign-service providers 
in those service industries which they have agreed to liberalize 
under GATS.”115 
The GATS contains a “framework text[,] which sets out the 
general concepts, principles, and rules that apply to measures 
affecting the trade in services,” but also “annexes [ ] to the 
agreement, which establish principles and rules for specific sec-
tors and complement the framework text [and] specific com-
mitments liberalizing trade within the service sectors and sub-
sectors listed in the national schedule of member countries.”116 
Unlike the GATT, countries can limit their commitments to 
particular service sectors; “some countries have limited their 
commitments to just a few of the 160 possible service sectors, 
while others have opened their markets (at varying degrees of 
openness) to more than 140 sectors.” 117 Therefore, the GATS 
represents a “list of the specific commitments to market liberal-
ization made by each member country,” which some countries 
have used to open their markets, while others are less willing 
to decrease trade barriers.118 
There are two types of rules or commitments that can poten-
tially bind a country that is a GATS signatory: conditional and 
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unconditional commitments.119 Unconditional commitments are 
general commitments by which all countries must abide and to 
which they are all bound.120 MFN treatment is an example of 
an unconditional commitment, under which a country must not 
discriminate between trading partners; if a country wants to 
afford better treatment to one country, they must afford that 
more favorable treatment to everyone.121 Countries also may 
not put limitations on national treatment, meaning that coun-
tries must afford “like” foreign services no less favorable treat-
ment than domestic services.122 The other type of commitment 
that may bind a country is a conditional commitment, where a 
country may voluntarily lower barriers to trade on a given 
schedule with regard to a specific service in a specific indus-
try.123 
The GATS contains different “Modes” of the service transac-
tions including: 
Mode 1: Cross-border movement of service products . . . Mode 
2: consumption abroad or movement of consumers to the 
country of importation . . . Mode 3: commercial presence of the 
establishment of a commercial presence in the country where 
the service is to be provided . . .[and] Mode 4: movement of 
natural persons or temporary movement of natural persons to 
another country, in order to provide the service there.124 
The conditional obligations only apply if a country identifies a 
particular service sector with respect to opening trade.125 
The GATS also contains exceptions similar to the GATT.126 
GATS section XIV, for example, creates an exception for a 
country that wants to protect “human, animal or plant life or 
health.”127 Another important exception is contained in GATS 
Article I(3) which “excludes services supplied in the ‘exercise of 
governmental authority,’” defined as services supplied neither 
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“on a commercial basis” nor “in competition with one or more 
services suppliers.”128 
B. The GATS’s Relation to Health Services 
 One way countries use the GATS is to lower barriers in 
health-related services by “opening national markets to foreign 
health services . . . [through a series] of trade agreements that 
prohibit discriminatory treatment of foreign suppliers” as well 
as encouraging the consumption of medical services abroad 
(Mode 1).129 Because the health sector is a lucrative market and 
has an enormous potential for growth, countries may want to 
voluntarily liberalize their policies relating to the exchange of 
health care services. 130  “Of greater significance, however, 
[scholars argue that] these markets are opening and will do so 
with or without the knowledge, experience, and perspective of 
the academic and commercial health care community of the de-
veloped world.”131 As countries close their borders and create 
restrictive policies, needy patients often have no choice but to 
turn to a preexisting black market for organs, which is often 
dangerous and can exploit many people in the process.132 There 
is a strong incentive to liberalize trade in health-related or 
transplantation-related services in order to crowd-out the black 
market and establish a legitimate and regulated market. 
GATS’s category consumption of medical services abroad 
(Mode 1) is particularly applicable to organ transplantation be-
cause of the profits and revenue involved.133 “Trade in mode 2 
is an important source of revenue for countries such as Cuba . . 
. and China . . . [and] the Mayo Clinic provides highly special-
ized services for wealthy foreigners, while specialty hospitals in 
India attract U.S. patients by providing international-quality 
liver transplants for one-tenth the U.S. cost.”134 
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C. Regulation Through the GATS is the Preferable Option 
Upon examination, the services involved in organ transplan-
tation do fit into the context of the GATS. Organ procurement 
and allocation systems around the world are largely estab-
lished upon geographic boundaries, giving preference to people 
in a certain geographic location before looking outside of these 
areas for other matches.135 Just like the gains from interna-
tional free trade that each country can experience, countries 
and sick patients can benefit from an international organ ex-
change system that is not based on geographic protectionism.136 
For example, “[t]he cross boarder exchange of donor organs al-
lows rare matches and help to specific transplant candi-
dates.”137 
In order to be governed by the GATS, organ transplantation 
needs to be considered a service. Medical services such as com-
plex surgeries, cosmetic surgery, and other types of advanced 
medical treatment are considered services because they involve 
a team of medical staff performing services on a patient.138 A 
procured organ, for example, would be useless without the op-
eration that transplants it into a new patient; the skill, safety, 
and technique of the operation is just as important as the actu-
al organ itself. Also, the surgery involved in procurement—a 
service—is very important in order to effectively extract, pre-
serve, transport, and transplant the organ from the donor to its 
future recipient.139 Although organ transplantation may not at 
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organ from a donor requires a complex surgery in order to ensure it is har-
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first glance meet the definition of a service as clearly as does 
general surgery, it is certainly a hybrid of services and can be 
treated as a service under the Modes relating to health services 
under the GATS. 
Once organ transplantation services can be thought of as a 
multiple jurisdictional service, the rules and jurisprudence 
commonly connected to the GATS will apply. One notable WTO 
case analyzed the GATS as it pertained to gambling compa-
nies.140 In this case, “the Caribbean Island nation of Antigua 
challenged three U.S. anti-racketeering statutes and four state 
laws as ‘barriers to trade’ in ‘cross-border gambling services’ 
under . . . [the] GATS.”141 Antigua argued that the American 
laws “prevented the supply of gambling and betting services 
from Antigua-domiciled Internet gambling providers to U.S. 
customers on a cross-border basis.”142 The “U.S. lost [the case] 
because it violated the ‘market access’ obligation” and they 
were unable to exercise the exception laid out for “public mor-
als” because that exception is limited.143 This case was a classic 
example of how the GATS prohibits countries closing their bor-
ders to foreign service-providers. 
																																																																																																																												
vested in a way that can be successfully transplanted in the future. Id. The 
next service involved is the transportation of the organ. Id. Organs can be 
very unstable and fragile, and need to be transported in a very specific way in 
a preservative chemical and under ice. Doctors must then follow a particular 
protocol and transport the organ from the hospital where procurement oc-
curred to a regional transplantation center usually on a helicopter or plane. 
Id. The final service involved not only involves a complex surgery by specially 
trained doctors, but also requires doctors and hospital staff to administer 
antibiotics and other anti-rejection drugs. Id. “While other surgery patients 
typically can move on from the experience, most transplant recipients must 
continue medical treatment for the rest of their lives” because of a weakened 
immune system. Id. 
 140. Panel Report, United States –Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30, 2007); 
WTO Internet Gambling Case, supra note 116 (The name of the WTO case 
involving foreign gambling companies is named “United States—Measures 
Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services.”). 
 141. WTO Internet Gambling Case, supra note 116 at 1. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 2. 
854 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:2 
The major goals of the GATS are to lower trade barriers to 
both providing and consuming services abroad.144 Trade barri-
ers can develop when a country provides services to a foreign 
national or when a citizen of one country goes abroad to con-
sume services.145 These two types of trade barriers can be illus-
trated through a hypothetical relationship between France and 
the United States. Suppose that an American doctor procures 
an organ, and an American transportation service or a non-
profit organization attempts to transport the organ to France. 
The French government may have passed a law stating that 
French transplant centers can only transplant organs that are 
procured in French regional hospitals. A French doctor would 
be prohibited from transplanting the organ procured using 
American services to anyone in France. In such an instance, a 
government would be preventing a foreign-service provider 
from providing a service domestically. Just as in the GATS 
gambling case, this would represent a violation under the 
GATS. 
The other major example of a classic GATS principle applied 
to this context is when a country prohibits a citizen from con-
suming a service abroad.146 This would occur if a U.S. law pro-
hibited a qualified needy American from traveling to France to 
obtain the services involved in an organ transplant. Under 
Mode 2 of the GATS, consumption of medical services abroad is 
considered a service and a country should not implement laws 
to prevent people from traveling and receiving medical services 
in another country, because this is a restraint on the free ex-
change of services internationally.147 
A common perception of the GATS is that it regulates ser-
vices where there is a competitive open market and involves 
monetary consideration or exchanges.148 While this is true in 
most cases, traditional market exchanges are not the only rea-
son to encourage trade liberalization in the exchange of ser-
vices. Countries may still want to create a market regulated 
through the GATS absent a traditional open market. In their 
																																																																																																																												
 144. Understanding the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 33–34, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf (last 
visited October 4, 2012). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 34. 
 147. Mutchnick et al., supra note 114, at 4. 
 148. GATS: Fact and Fiction, supra note 55, at 3. 
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article “GATS: Fact and Fiction,” the WTO emphasizes the 
benefits that trade liberalization in services would provide to 
consumers, especially, “[i]n markets where supply is inade-
quate, [for example] imports of essential services can be as vi-
tal as imports of basic commodities.”149 Organ shortages are a 
problem in almost every country around the world and “[t]he 
benefits of services liberalization extend far beyond the service 
industries themselves; they are felt through their effects on all 
other economic activities,” similar to potential savings in the 
health care sector.150 Countries may benefit from the liberaliza-
tion of trade in services for other reasons, including foreign di-
rect investment in a developing country. 
The altruistic theory that underlies most transplantation sys-
tems provides another reason why countries would benefit from 
trade liberalization in services absent an established open 
market. If governments believe in the value of altruistic dona-
tion and want organs to be exchanged or to be available for 
needy people around the world, then they may want to prevent 
barriers to the trade in services or organs even though no mon-
ey is changing hands. It is a well-established principle, rein-
forced by the WHO, that organs are not to be exchanged for 
valuable consideration, but countries still may want to use the 
mechanism of the GATS to reap the benefits of exchange, ab-
sent a traditional for-profit organ market. 
The opportunity to utilize the preexisting black market for 
organs constitutes yet another significant reason that countries 
may want to use GATS to regulate the exchange of transplan-
tation services. Countries will want to create a legitimate organ 
exchange in order to crowd out the exploitive black market. 
Crowding out the black market may be a very effective tactic 
for countries, especially in light of the recent boom of social 
media. Organ traffickers could use social media to find poor 
donors with wealthy sick patients and use these sites to sell 
organs or exchange organs for valuable consideration. Because 
of people’s ability to use social media to reach beyond their so-
cial circles and communicate with people around the world, it is 
unrealistic to think that one country’s laws can stop people 
from using social media sites like Facebook or Twitter to find 
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organs.151 Social media has the potential to worsen the problem 
of organ trafficking because it easily could connect buyers and 
sellers,152 and therefore countries may want to embrace the fact 
that people want to look outside their borders for life-saving 
resources and regulate the process so it is more controlled and 
safe. 
If human organ transplants are considered to be a service 
under the GATS, then what is now labeled as “transplant tour-
ism” can be a legal, regulated, and positive advancement in the 
global organ shortage dilemma. 
D. How Regulation of Organ Transplantation Will Practically 
Operate 
Under the optimal framework proposed, countries would vol-
untarily commit themselves to a schedule of commitments 
made up of market access, national treatment, and MFN 
treatment in health services relating to organ transplantation, 
which would create an international organ exchange based on 
medical need, efficiency, and practical considerations. Coun-
tries would follow a GATS framework, which allows countries 
to open their markets on their own schedule, and tailor their 
commitments to a narrow sector relating to certain services.153 
																																																																																																																												
 151. See, e.g., New Kidney on the Block: Woman Finds Organ Donor via 80’s 
Singer Donnie Wahlberg and Twitter, DAILY MAIL, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1380817/New-Kidney-block-Woman-
finds-organ-donor-80s-singer-Donnie-Wahlberg-
Twitter.html#ixzz1ZwCYRrqN (last updated Apr. 26, 2011, 2:21 PM). The 
power of social media is exemplified through the story of Bobbette Miller, 
who desperately needed a kidney transplant but “faced a grueling five year 
wait for a new organ.” Id. Her friend started a “Twitter campaign” to find her 
an organ donor and Donnie Wahlberg, New Kids On The Block band member 
and teen idol, offered to help. Id. He tweeted to his over 180,000 Twitter fol-
lowers and among the numerous responses he found a perfect match. Id. So-
cial media can now be used as a tool to match patients with donors, but social 
media may also be used as a dangerous interface for trafficking. Id.; Healy, 
supra note 8. 
 152. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 8; Matt Richtel and Kevin Sack, Facebook 
Is Urging Members to Add Organ Donor Status, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/technology/facebook-urges-members-to-
add-organ-donor-status.html?_r=1 (“[E]xperts say Facebook could create an 
informal alternative to such registries that could, even though it carries less 
legal weight, lead to more organ donations.”). 
 153. Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments and 
the List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
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Under a GATS schedule of commitments each country lists 
“which services sectors and under what conditions the basic 
principles of the GATS[—]market access, national treatment 
and MFN treatment—apply within that country’s jurisdic-
tion.”154 These commitments are also listed “with respect to 
each of the four modes of supply”: “cross-border supply; con-
sumption abroad; commercial presence; and presence of natu-
ral persons.”155 With respect to organ transplantation services, 
a country could choose to voluntarily commit to open their 
markets in organ and health related services in the cross-
border supply sector, where “non-resident service suppliers . . . 
supply services cross-border into the Member’s territory” or the 
consumption abroad sector, where there is “freedom for the 
Member’s residents to [consume] services in the territory of an-
other Member.”156 When countries agree to bind themselves to 
commitments in a given sector “a government therefore binds 
the specified level of market access and national treatment and 
undertakes not to impose any new measures that would re-
strict entry into the market or the operation of the service.”157 
Countries will be allowed to list exemptions and limitations on 
their commitments in their schedules with a description of 
what the exemption is and to whom it applies.158 They also 
must list how long it will last and “the conditions creating the 
need for the exemption.” 159 In relation to organ transplantation 
services, countries may want to develop their own systems, or 
slowly phase-in to this drastic change in the market. The GATS 
allows countries to clearly state in writing any limitations to 
market access and list any conditions upon which their total 
market access may be conditioned, such as a certain level of 
																																																																																																																												
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 
2012). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. (“Specific commitments thus have an effect similar to a tariff bind-
ing—they are a guarantee to economic operators in other countries that the 
conditions of entry and operation in the market will not be changed to their 
disadvantage.”). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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health and safety standards, or internationally recognized or-
gan need criteria.160 
E. Other Necessary Complimentary Aspects of the Proposal 
In conjunction with multilateral commitments through the 
GATS, participating states need to establish a set of minimum 
health and safety standards in order to monitor and encourage 
the trade of organ and transplantation services between coun-
tries. Regulations relating to health and safety standards are 
essential to maintaining the quality and integrity of existing 
organ transplantation systems that exist within countries, im-
proving developing transplantation centers, and ensuring that 
organs are being safely procured, transported, delivered, and 
transplanted. Requiring these minimum standards, however, is 
not only about ensuring safety during the transplantation pro-
cess, but also inspiring confidence in the public, increasing the 
legitimacy of the organ exchange system and increasing dona-
tion rates. One of the fundamental reasons that Spain is con-
sidered the “world champion of cadaveric organ donation” is 
because of its successful public relations campaign, which in-
creases the awareness and integrity of the system to the gen-
eral public.161 When the international community is confident 
that there are minimum standards and a relevant enforcement 
mechanism, it will increase the credibility of the program, and 
																																																																																																																												
 160. SERVICES: COMMITMENTS: Schedules of commitments and lists of 
Article II exemptions, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_commitments_e.htm (last 
visited October 3, 2012). For example, in the United States’ schedule of com-
mitments, under the category “08. Health Related and Social Services,” mar-
ket access is unbound except for the following conditions: “Establishment of 
hospitals or other health care facilities, procurement of specific types of medi-
cal equipment, or provision of specific types of medical procedures may be 
subject to needs-based quantitative limits,” as well as limitations on corpo-
rate ownership of hospitals in New York and Michigan. Id. In this sector, the 
United States is unbound in national treatment except for the fact that “Fed-
eral or state government reimbursement of medical expenses is limited to 
licensed, certified facilities in the United States or in a specific US state.” Id. 
In this same sector the European Community is unbound in national treat-
ment except for a limitation on market access of “the number of beds and use 
of heavy medical equipment is limited on the basis of a health plan” and the 
commitments are subject to a “needs test,” which is further defined in detail 
in the schedule. Id. 
 161. Opting Out of Opting Out, supra note 5. 
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dispel common misconceptions and horror stories that current-
ly discourage donation. 
The EUODD’s system of minimum standards may be a step 
to initiate a conversation on organ exchange, but the EU’s pro-
posed system falls short. The minimum standards aspect of the 
instant proposal creates more overall equity between develop-
ing and developed nations by allowing developing countries 
more flexibility to develop their own legitimate organ allocation 
systems. The EUODD may de jure discriminate against devel-
oping countries or countries without a comprehensive organ 
procurement and allocation system because it immediately im-
poses strict health and safety standards in an “all or nothing” 
way and does not allow any time or flexibility for them to de-
velop and adapt to meet the standards. Under the EUODD 
proposal, there is a traceability requirement where in order to 
have any organ exchange a country needs to know high levels 
of information about the donor, the process and health and 
safety information.162 This is a very hard standard to meet if a 
country did not already have such a system in place. A more 
widespread multilateral agreement to bind countries through 
voluntary commitments and based on schedules reflecting 
countries’ own situations will allow countries to develop their 
infrastructure, allow the medical services sector to gradually 
meet the minimum health standards, and provide opportuni-
ties for private health companies or other countries to invest in 
the health sectors in developing countries. This suggestion 
aligns with the enabling clause idea found in the GATT, which 
gives a special exception to developing countries in order to al-
low them to develop. 
It will also be essential for countries to commit themselves to 
nationalizing transplantation lists within countries. A country 
maintaining a unified allocation list not only makes logical 
sense, but also is essential for the implementation of an inter-
national exchange. It is more beneficial to society if organs are 
shared between nations, so it is important for countries that 
have many transplantation centers to nationalize lists and not 
utilize the same outdated geographic system that this plan at-
tempts to replace. This is especially true at a domestic level, 
where shorter geographic distances can easily allow for organs 
to be shipped to different centers provided the organ and medi-
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cal technologies are available.163 Internationally, as in other 
aspects of international relations, countries will need to inter-
act with each other on a state-by-state basis in order to practi-
cally implement an international organ exchange. 
F. Interaction with Domestic Laws and Transplant Policy 
It is important to also examine how this proposal would in-
teract with existing domestic law and transplant policy in par-
ticipating countries. Most countries and the international med-
ical community would agree that the convergence of health and 
safety regulations is positive progress and not difficult to im-
plement. Most developed countries operate their procurement 
and allocation systems with medical health and safety stand-
ards that are up to date with current medical practice. Coun-
tries like the United States, EU member countries, and many 
other developed nations all have legal standards regarding 
health and safety based on scientific and medical infor-
mation.164  Adopting domestic regulations to adhere to these 
standards would likely be a welcomed and relatively easy tran-
sition. Through the EUODD protocol that was implemented 
August 27, 2012, EU members now have standardized health 
and safety standards; 165 and expanding this to the internation-
al community is essential to the operation of the proposal. With 
harmonized quality control and safety standards, countries can 
share information about health and medical advancements 
that will benefit organ procurement, transportation, and trans-
plantation worldwide. Leading doctors and professionals in the 
international medical community would generate the particu-
lars of the minimum standards and all countries could elect to 
adopt these standards. Minimum standards and a regulatory 
framework would increase donation rates as transparency 
would dispel common fears and misconceptions that often keep 
people from donating. 
Financial considerations, such as who will carry the mone-
tary burden of the surgery and transportation will continue to 
																																																																																																																												
 163. Segev, supra note 29, at 360. 
 164. Directive, supra note 4, at 3; see, e.g., Minimum Procurement Stand-
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be managed as they are currently. Under the proposal, the cost 
of the exchange will continue to be borne by the patient and 
their insurance company. While transplants are very expen-
sive, it makes sense for the person who will benefit from the 
live organ to pay for the procedure. Transporting organs inter-
nationally will drastically increase these costs to a level that 
may be prohibitively high for certain patients, but this does not 
subtract from the virtues of an exchange that will allow more 
patients to be matched efficiently and accurately. Also, the 
more countries that actively participate in the exchange with 
minimal restrictions, the more that the incidental costs borne 
by the donor country will eventually equalize. 
The proposal would be compatible with most domestic pro-
curement laws that exist in a majority of countries. It would 
not force countries to change their organ procurement regimes, 
which are based on their moral standards and preferences. An 
opt-in country like the United States could continue with their 
procurement preferences, and an opt-out country like Spain 
could continue with their methods, and this proposal would not 
force a certain ideal upon any given country. 
Few countries use systems that would fundamentally conflict 
with this proposal. Those conflicting systems are ones that ei-
ther allow the sale of organs or have internal reciprocity ar-
rangements. Iran is the only country that currently has an 
open market for organs, and they would not be able to partici-
pate with this proposal because most countries around the 
world ban the exchange of organs for valuable consideration. 
Israel’s new organ procurement law—creating a hierarchy 
within the country and a weighted list based on a person’s will-
ingness to donate or their family members’ willingness to do-
nate166—is one example of a system that would not be compati-
ble with the protocol, and Israel would either need to change its 
law or be excluded from the international organ exchange. A 
country exchanging transplantation services internationally 
cannot rank or give preference to citizens, because this almost 
certainly will put foreign patients at the bottom of the list. 
Practically, countries may still want to give a certain level of 
preference to domestic candidates under certain circumstances, 
but Israel’s law would never allow a foreigner to gain enough 
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preference on the list to receive a transplant.167 As noted earli-
er, Israel’s new law has come under scrutiny because of reli-
gious and ethical concerns, but would also have to be over-
hauled to include the real possibility of foreigners receiving 
transplants and decreasing its overall protectionism.168 
G. Challenges and Limits to Establishing an International Or-
gan Exchange 
A major consideration when analyzing the proposal’s vitality 
is whether multilateral cooperation for organ allocation is prac-
tically feasible, regardless of the use of the GATS framework. 
Commentators may doubt that cooperation is a realistic option 
because nationalism is very powerful and countries are often 
selfish with their scarce and coveted resources. As noted, hu-
man organs are not a resource that can be legally exchanged 
for monetary consideration,169 raising legitimate questions re-
garding countries’ incentives to essentially surrender organs 
and exchange them with the unfamiliar populations of other 
nations. Countries may need practical motivations in order to 
engage in international cooperation absent a formal reciprocity 
contract. In addition, these motivations must appeal to local 
constituencies because a lawmaker’s suggestion to send organs 
abroad may prove to be politically unpopular when it is a well-
known fact that there is already a domestic shortage of organs. 
Though these are valid concerns, there are very compelling 
motivations for countries and governments to cooperate inter-
nationally in the context of organ allocation and transplanta-
tion. These considerations include increasing efficiency, reduc-
ing health care and transaction costs, creating a more produc-
tive workforce, responding to strong political pressures, and 
increasing overall donation rates. In light of these practical 
benefits, an international organ exchange under the GATS is a 
realistic possibility for the future of organ procurement and al-
location. 
1. Increasing Efficiency and Decreasing Costs 
First, consider organ allocation from an efficiency perspec-
tive. The traditional model of organ allocation prioritizes the 
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sickest patients first and restricts exchange to small geograph-
ic locales.170 This creates large inefficiencies that lead to “huge 
disparities in waiting times—and hence deaths—across the 
country as organs frequently do not go to the sickest pa-
tients.”171 An increase in the size of the potential population 
“pool” for distribution will create fewer disparities and save 
more lives, especially if patients can be matched faster with 
donors around the world.172 Speed is essential to the success of 
transplants.173 Additionally, because some organs are matched 
based on biological similarity, the benefit of a wider genetic 
pool of patients and donors would drastically increase the suc-
cess rate of transplants. 
The case of kidney transplants provides a helpful example in 
this context. Kidneys are largely allocated based on genetic 
compatibility. 174 Currently “the one-year organ-graft survival 
rate for well-matched kidneys is 13% higher than that for poor-
ly matched ones.” 175  If the donor pool expanded worldwide, 
there would be more genetically suitable kidneys to match with 
more patients, and the success rate of each transplant would 
increase. Health care costs to support a patient with kidney 
failure are extremely high and are most often paid for by gov-
ernments.176 Dialysis is very costly because of frequent hospital 
stays and necessary long-term care; in addition, most long-term 
dialysis patients fund their treatment through government 
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.177 
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 172. Roth, supra note 63, at 52 (There may exist gains from exchange that 
“come . . . from extending the possibility of exchange to all regions of the 
country, and from the additional exchanges arising as a result of a thicker 
market consisting of more available patient–donor pairs.”). 
 173. Id. (noting that “the two-year organ-graft survival rate for patients 
who are in intensive care before their liver transplants is approximately 50%, 
compared to 75% for transplantees who are still relatively healthy”). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Siegal & Bonnie, supra note 8 at 415. 
 177. Id. (“The costs attributed to organ shortage [were] substantial—
Medicare paid over $15.5 billion in 2002 for treating patients with end-stage 
renal-disease, who predominate on organ waiting lists.”); Nadel, supra note 8, 
at 293–295 (noting that every year “over 85,000 candidates remain on the 
transplant waiting lists, . . . [the majority] waiting for kidneys, resulting in 
864 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:2 
Governments, therefore, have a strong financial incentive to 
broaden the pool and match people with kidneys that will be 
the most genetically suitable. Matching patients with kidney 
transplants sooner will eliminate significant costs because “it is 
cheaper to have a transplant than to stay on dialysis for more 
than two and half years, even among the sickest patients.”178 
The savings are even greater for high risk patients, or patients 
“with heart disease, diabetes or older age,” which will be in-
creasingly more common with an aging baby boomer popula-
tion.179 In a 1999 study, United States researchers found that 
the medical system could save $27,000 per patient per year if 
they were to get a kidney transplant instead of receiving dialy-
sis treatment for that year.180 At the time there were 220,000 
people on kidney dialysis in the United States; thus, if every-
one receiving dialysis were able to receive a transplant, the 
savings result for just one year would be $5.94 billion.181 Even 
if just 20% of patients in one year were able to receive kidney 
transplants instead of remaining on dialysis, the savings would 
be almost $2 billion.182 Biological matching is the way of the 
future in medicine and governments will feel pressure to use 
these new methods to more efficiently and effectively match 
patients, necessarily favoring an allocation system with a wider 
geographic reach.183 
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2. Decreasing Transaction Costs 
Second, governments will want to cooperate internationally 
in order to save on transaction costs and research and devel-
opment expenses. When overhead costs can be spread over a 
larger number of units, the unit price decreases.184 Countries 
invest large amounts of money on their organ transplantations 
and allocations systems, and increasing the scope of these pro-
grams will decrease costs for all parties. Nationalizing lists and 
coordinating donor pools with other countries will avoid the 
cost of maintaining separate functioning allocation schemes 
and high administrative costs. Research and development is 
also expensive, and encouraging international cooperation 
through a new international forum will encourage intellectual 
collaboration in order to find more effective ways to save lives. 
3. Strong Political Pressure on Governments 
Third, strong political pressure may compel governments to 
cooperate internationally. Because government policy against 
organ sale and transplant tourism prevents citizens from re-
ceiving the services they demand, citizens are likely to pressure 
their elected officials to adopt a system of international organ 
exchange.185 Under current allocation systems, unless a citizen 
is willing to move or engage in dangerous and illegal trans-
plant tourism, they are left without recourse. Transplant tour-
ism is already a growing industry and governments must face 
this fact.186 Because governments respond to constituent pres-
sure, countries will be motivated to adopt a scheme of interna-
tional cooperation as a means of legitimately allowing their cit-
izens to engage in regulated transplant tourism. With large 
amounts of people independently engaging in transplant tour-
ism, it is neither effective nor good policy for governments to 
simply outlaw an activity that their constituents demand. Citi-
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zens will therefore lobby their governments to move toward an 
international organ exchange regime. 
Governments also may receive political pressure because in 
some respects geographic-based and country-based allocation 
systems can be viewed as legally discriminatory. It is a medical 
fact that “the quality of the biological match is usually better 
when both the donor and recipient are of the same race.”187 Ge-
ographic limitations lead to small biological samples and a rel-
atively homogeneous pool of donors and recipients. Thus, in 
purposely restricting the pool by refusing to adopt an interna-
tional system, a government is essentially discriminating 
against minorities who have statistically less compatible 
matches in the donor pool, and therefore a lower chance of re-
ceiving a lifesaving kidney. “To back away from a national sys-
tem [or international system] or to minimize the importance of 
biological matching on this basis alone would essentially be 
placing a higher value on the lives of some patients than oth-
ers, which would be discriminatory.”188 Governments, especial-
ly in countries that have had sensitive histories involving racial 
discrimination will be highly motivated to broaden the genetic 
pool of donors and recipients in order to combat any claim of 
racial discrimination. 
4. Potential Increase in Donation Rates 
Finally, governments will be motivated to use the GATS as a 
means of international cooperation because it may increase do-
nation rates. Donations increase when a domestic allocation 
system is perceived to be legitimate and may be hindered when 
it is perceived to be discriminatory or not transparent.189 For 
example, people can become skeptical of a country’s allocation 
system when they hear rumors of wealthy or foreign citizens 
being prioritized because of their status. Many people are dis-
couraged from donating because of common misconceptions and 
fears about their country’s organ allocation system.190 Using 
the GATS to allow countries to cooperate in a familiar con-
text—through the WTO—will dispel many fears that inhibit 
donation. The Spanish model highlights the importance of pub-
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lic perceived legitimacy and how this can translate into in-
creased donation rates.191 Governments would be highly moti-
vated to cooperate internationally if more organs were availa-
ble to its own citizens through higher donation rates because of 
the system’s legitimacy and transparency. 
H. Specific Limitations Relating to the Use of the GATS 
While the GATS provides a useful framework for countries to 
create an international organ exchange, there are some limita-
tions associated with the GATS itself that may impede the ef-
fectiveness of the exchange. One main criticism of the GATS, 
which also may apply in its relation to organ transplantation 
services, is that countries have “the right to maintain public 
services and the power to enforce health and safety stand-
ards.”192 If countries believe that their own regulation of public 
health services preempts all international cooperation in the 
area, then an international exchange could not function. The 
GATS in this context, however, does not limit a country’s abil-
ity to manage their own health care systems because countries 
can personalize their commitments under the exemptions and 
schedules.193 Additionally, “the GATS allows countries to im-
pose domestic regulations on services, if they do so in a nondis-
criminatory way.”194 
Another potential criticism may be that under the Article 
XIV exception, a country does not have to abide by GATS rules 
if they are attempting to protect “human, animal or plant life 
or health.”195 Although the language is broad, this exception 
does not mean that countries are not allowed to create com-
mitments related to health services. For example, countries do 
have schedules of commitments on health and hospital ser-
vices.196 The exception does allow a country to use Article XIV 
to avoid liberalizing trade with respect to a certain area be-
cause they are attempting to protect health. However, under 
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the framework of the GATS, “countries . . . have the option of 
establishing limits on market access or national treatment 
commitments . . . [and in fact, f]ew countries have made ‘full’ 
commitments in the health service sector—that is, commit-
ments without any limitations.”197 Thus, because the GATS is 
comprised of voluntary commitments, a country need not use 
this exception if they wanted to limit trade, because they would 
simply choose not to liberalize with respect to that area. 
Countries may also attempt to use the GATS Article I(3) ex-
ception in order to avoid liberalization. The Article I(3) excep-
tion excludes “services supplied in the ‘exercise of governmen-
tal authority,’ defined as services supplied neither ‘on a com-
mercial basis’ nor ‘in competition with one or more services 
suppliers.’”198 A country may argue that organ transplants are 
not offered on a commercial basis and that the regulation of 
transplantation is an exercise of governmental authority. 
Scholars and regulators have not explored this part of the 
GATS in depth, but as discussed above, countries may have 
strong practical and theoretical incentives to regulate organ 
transplantation using the GATS. 199  Since participation in 
GATS is voluntary, and countries can personalize their obliga-
tions, Article I(3) should not raise any additional issues. 
Due to these exemptions and a country’s ability to choose 
their own level of liberalization with respect to each sector, 
there is a legitimate worry that these limits could undermine 
the creation of the exchange itself. While exemptions do exist, 
countries would ideally use these exemptions to personalize the 
agreement for their country, and not to defeat the objectives 
and purpose of creating an international exchange in this ser-
vice sector. 
Critics may be skeptical of the GATS’s actual ability to in-
crease market access and liberalize. Scholars argue that there 
has been “very little progress in terms of increased market ac-
cess and elimination of discriminatory treatment.”200 Further-
more, scholars describe that “[a]s agreements start to take 
shape, countries may still restrict the entry and practice of for-
eign providers and may limit foreign direct investment with 
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discriminatory tax and regulatory policies. The GATS encour-
ages these types of rules if they demonstrably protect the pub-
lic’s health.”201 If the GATS did not effectively liberalize the 
market in the exchange for organ transplantation services, the 
proposal would not have its desired effects. Although this is a 
valid concern, countries will have incentives to use the GATS to 
liberalize their trade policies with respect to procurement and 
transplantation services, and not to perpetuate their protec-
tionism, because of the strong public support of this unprece-
dented initiative. 
CONCLUSION 
The international community is beginning to entertain the 
idea of drastic reform for organ exchanges. The correct step is 
for countries to adopt a multilateral system of international 
exchange in organ transplantation services and eliminate the 
protectionist laws that limit organ supply and that disad-
vantage developing countries. If countries continue to look in-
wards for solutions, the black market will thrive and dangerous 
organ trafficking and unregulated transplant tourism will be-
come even more prominent. Countries also have strong practi-
cal incentives for adopting a system of international coopera-
tion, and will receive domestic political pressure to make seri-
ous changes to their current allocation schemes if left unal-
tered. 
Any solution must be compatible with communal and highly 
valued moral ideals, particularly altruism. The GATS is attrac-
tive because it is a pre-existing treaty and the WTO serves as a 
built-in enforcement mechanism; countries can use the WTO’s 
dispute resolution forum if real disputes arise over the applica-
tion of the treaty. Using the GATS to regulate and increase ex-
change between countries is not only a means to help needy 
patients worldwide, but furthers the goals of altruistic donation 
and increases the legitimacy of organ donation. 
But what country will take the lead in these efforts? The EU 
has taken steps to create a harmonized system, but this does 
not go far enough because the EUODD does not emphasize a 
true international organ exchange. The answer may be that 
this is an opportunity for non-profits and NGOs to take the 
lead in order to convince countries to cooperate and interna-
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tionally exchange transplantation services. Organizations such 
as Eurotransplant and NHS Blood and Transplant are already 
aiding the EU with its changes in its organ transplant policy.202 
Potentially, other non-profits can provide support, data, and 
expertise in the transition to an international exchange. 
The GATS framework is capable of regulating organ pro-
curement and transplantation and is a valuable tool for coun-
tries. A well-regulated international organ exchange would lit-
erally save lives and should be seriously considered by the in-
ternational community. 
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